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Alcantara v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 28 (Apr. 3, 2014)
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CIVIL PROCEDURE: CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION 
 
Summary 
 
 Whether issue and/or claim preclusion can prevent an heir from asserting a wrongful-
death claim under NRS 41.085(4) when the decedent’s estate had previously attempted but failed 
to succeed on a wrongful death claim under NRS 41.085(5). 
 
Disposition 
 
  Issue preclusion may prevent an heir from asserting a wrongful death claim under NRS 
41.085(4) if the four elements of the doctrine are satisfied.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
The Appellant, Alcantara (“Alcantara”), filed a wrongful death action against Respondent 
Wal-Mart (“Wal-Mart”), in behalf of her daughter, when the father was fatally assaulted in a 
Wal-Mart parking lot. Wal-Mart moved for a motion to dismiss based on the doctrines of issue 
and claim preclusion because the case had already been brought by the decedent’s estate. In that 
action the jury found that Wal-Mart was not negligent and, therefore, not liable for the 
decedent’s death. The district court granted the motion to dismiss based on claim preclusion. 
This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court reviewed the district court’s conclusions of law de novo. 
 
Statutory framework 
 
 NRS 41.085 provides that the heirs of the decedent and the personal representative of the 
decedent are allowed to bring separate wrongful death claims, but they cannot pursue the other’s 
separate claim.
2
 NRS 41.085(2) and (3), respectively, provide that “the heirs of the decedent and 
the personal representatives of the decedent may each maintain an action for damages” and that 
the causes of action “which arose out of the same wrongful act or neglect may be joined.” 
(Emphasis added).
3
 
  
Whether claim preclusion bar Alcantara’s claims 
 
 Alcantara argued that the district court’s determination based on claim preclusion was 
erroneous because NRS 41.085 provides for separate claims. In order to resolve this issue, the 
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Court focused its analysis on the third prong of claim preclusion. Specifically, the Court sought 
to determine if “the subsequent action [was] based on the same claims or any part of them were 
or could have been brought in the first case.”4  
 The Court noted that the NRS 41.085 statutory scheme clearly created separate wrongful 
death claims for the heirs of a decedent and the decedent’s estate– one of the personal 
representative, or the estate, under NRS 41.085(5) and one of the heirs, Alcantara, under NRS 
41.085(5). Accordingly, the two claims in the case were separate and failed to meet the 
requirement that the claims in the second claim be the same as those that were or could have 
been brought in the first case. Therefore, claim preclusion did not apply to this case despite the 
fact that both claims arose from the death of the decedent. 
 
Whether issue preclusion bars Alcantara’s claims 
 
 In addition to its argument for claim preclusion, Wal-Mart also presented the argument 
that issue preclusion is appropriate in this case as an independent basis for affirming the appeal. 
In response, the Court looked into the four elements of issue preclusion
5
 to determine if the 
doctrine applied to the present case. Before turning to a full analysis of the factors, the Court 
found that the second element was satisfied by pointing out that the prior case was finally 
resolved on the merits.  The Court then turned to the other three elements of issue preclusion: 
same issues, same parties, and actually and necessarily litigated.  
 
The same issues 
 
 Alcantara asserted that the first element of issue preclusion is not met because there are 
significant differences in the legal theories presented in the two actions. In the present case, 
Alcantara argued that Wal-Mart had a nondelegable duty to provide safe premises which, based 
on Alcantara’s assertion, was not made in the prior case by the estate. 
 The Court disposed of this argument by saying that the claim of nondelegable duty is not 
an independent cause of action, but instead one way to establish the duty requirement for proving 
negligence.
7
 The Court also stated that  “[I]ssue preclusion cannot be avoided by attempting to 
raise a new legal or factual argument that involves the same ultimate issue previously decided in 
another case.” 8  Wal-Mart’s negligence was the core of the first case and Alcantara’s 
nondelegable duty claim is not separate and distinct from that claim of negligence because it is 
based on the same facts and merely seeks to establish the duty element of negligence. Thus, this 
element was meThe same parties or their privies 
 Alcantara next argued the third elementwas not met because she was not in privity with 
the estate in the prior action. Moreover, Alcantara argued that the district court erred when it 
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relied on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments section 41
10
 because the Nevada Supreme 
Court had not adopted that section. Wal-Mart countered Alcantara’s argument by pointing out 
that she was a beneficiary of the estate and was therefore adequately represented in the estate’s 
litigation of Wal-Mart’s alleged negligence in the prior action. This would render her in privity 
with the estate and issue preclusion would prevent her current claims. 
 In response to these arguments, the Court took this opportunity to adopt the Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments section 41’s examples of privity that arise when a plaintiff’s interests are 
being represented by someone else. Next, the Court applied the Restatement section 41(1)(c)
11
 to 
the present case and concluded that Alcantara was in privity with the estate in its prior action. 
Alcantara was bound to the prior judgment because the estate was representing her interests as an 
heir to the estate. Therefore, the representation was sufficient for privity.
12
 Additionally, “since 
the issue for determining relief under NRS 41.085(4) and  NRS 41.085(5) is the same —Wal-
Mart’s negligence— the estate fully represented Alcantara’s interests as to the issue of 
negligence.” 
 Finally, the Court noted that sections 46(3) and 47 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments are also relevant in this matter despite the fact that they involve different procedural 
scenarios than the present case.
13
 These sections state “that issue preclusion will apply to a 
second case brought by a beneficiary of the decedent if the prior case brought by the decedent or 
the decedent’s estate is unsuccessful.” Accordingly, this element was met. 
 
Actually and necessarily litigated 
 
 Lastly, the Court looked at whether the fourth element of issue preclusion was met in this 
case. The previous case determined whether Wal-Mart was liable for the decedent’s death based 
on negligence. Since the previous case was determined on the merits, the issue of Wal-Mart’s 
negligence was actually and necessarily litigated in the prior action. Thus, this element along 
with all others for issue preclusion were met.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court, in following the reasoning in Evans v. Celotex Corp.
15
 found that Wal-Mart’s 
negligence was properly raised in the prior action brought by the decedent’s estate. Therefore, 
issue preclusion applies to Alcantara’s claim and she is barred from re-litigating the issue of 
Wal-Mart’s negligence.  The Court affirmed the decision of the district court to dismiss the case. 
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